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Introduction 
 
There is little attention paid to the international political linkages that New 
Zealand has forged thorough its connection to Antarctica. On the ground in 
Antarctica itself there is evidence abound that New Zealand is enjoying strong 
bilateral cooperation with a number of parties, from Malaysian scientists using 
Scott Base as a base of operations US air force planes have ‘City of 
Christchurch’ written on their side. However, virtually no research has been 
done into the nature of these relationships, how they were formed, their 
dynamics and the benefits and burdens they place upon New Zealand. This 
paper intends to provide some research into this area by using primary 
resources to paint a picture as to how New Zealand has created and 
maintained bilateral relationships regarding Antarctica. Those resources are 
old documents of the now disbanded Antarctic Division of the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, sourced through Archives New Zealand.  
 
The focus of the paper is on whether New Zealand was using its Antarctic 
connection improve upon its bilateral relationships with other states in other 
areas, for example, the using Antarctic cooperation as a carrot in negotiating 
a Free Trade Agreement. However, upon research, it soon became apparent 
the New Zealand was not using these connections in such a way, and also 
that these connections are little acknowledged. It appears that in practice, 
New Zealand’s Antarctic aims, activities and relationships are kept separate 
from New Zealand’s other international activities. It seems as if a foreign 
policy blind spot exits towards Antarctic and the Southern Ocean bilateral 
cooperation.  
 
This paper shall explain this blind spot by using the organisational politics 
model first proposed by Graham T Allison, and also examine the role of at 
United States bureaucratic organisation that has a major influence in New 
Zealand’s Antarctic policy: the National Science Foundation (NSF). As shall 
be explained, New Zealand is actually constrained in its ability to use its 
Antarctic connection as an incentive for relationships with other states due to 
the NSF being the dominant force in logistics in Christchurch. The 
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organisational politics model will also help explain why New Zealand is not 
using this cooperation to further its relationships.  
 
The argument of this paper is that the disconnected nature of New Zealand’s 
Antarctic operations and the focus on logistics, combined with the restricting 
capabilities of the NSF has in the past prevented New Zealand from using its 
Antarctic advantage to further bilateral relationships.  
 
New Zealand’s Antarctic Advantage 
 
A claimant state and a founding member of the Antarctic Treaty, New Zealand 
has been active in Antarctic politics since 1957, being a consultative state in 
the Antarctic Treaty System and maintains a year-round presence in the Ross 
Sea region.  
 
New Zealand’s Antarctic advantage arises out of its geographical proximity to 
the Ross Sea region. Few states are located far enough south to provide 
launching point for an Antarctic programme, and the Ross Sea region is a 
frequently used access point to reach the South Pole. The use of New 
Zealand as the final port before Antarctica dates back to the historic era of 
Antarctic exploration, with famous explorers such as Scott and Shackleton 
using Christchurch and the Port of Lyttleton as a launching pad.  
 
The city of Christchurch having the International Antarctic Centre, acts and 
the logistical base for New Zealand’s Ross Sea activities. Not only does the 
New Zealand programme operate out of Christchurch, but so does the United 
States which, uses Christchurch as a lunching pad for flights to both McMurdo 
- their largest Antarctic base - and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station as well 
as Lyttleton as a port for ships to McMurdo, and Italy, which operates in a 
similar manner.  
 
These three states cooperate in Antarctic logistics by providing resources in a 
“pool”. All three will provide flights which take personnel and cargo from all 
three Antarctic programmes.  
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Other launching pads for Antarctic activities include Argentina, Chile, 
Tasmania, South Africa and the Falklands Islands. The South American 
located ports have proximity to the Antarctic Peninsular.  
 
In Antarctica, New Zealand has an advantage that other states cannot gain 
and New Zealand does reap economic benefit from this position. 1 The New 
Zealand’s economy - and particularly Christchurch’s - benefits from the link.2 
There is an economic benefits to be had therefore, from more Antarctic 
programmes operating out of Christchurch.  
 
Many states that New Zealand has been building economic relationships with 
are also coincidentally interested in Antarctic research and are expanding 
their Antarctic programmes. India, for example, which is becoming an 
economic powerhouse, also has an expanding Antarctic programme.3 China, 
which New Zealand has recently signed a free trade agreement with, also has 
been expanding its Antarctic presence.4 Offering up use of Christchurch as an 
Antarctic launch pad could potentially be used to create closer relationships, 
increasing preferential treatment in creating Free Trade Agreements.  
 
The New Zealand scientific community could also potentially benefit from 
cooperation. The facilities of other states could become of use, from Antarctic 
bases in other locations, to icebreakers to maybe even the use of Arctic 
research centres.  
 
The potential benefits from using this connection are thus threefold. The 
connection can be used for economic benefit, it can be used to strengthen 
bilateral relationships prove beneficial for New Zealand and finally, there are 
scientific benefits to be had.  
                                                 
1 Stuart Prior ‘Antarctica: View from a Gateway’ (Centre for Strategic Studies Working Paper 
5/97, 1997) 
2 Ibid. Estimated to be $40-$50 million annually.  
3 Anne-Marie Brady, Elizabeth Holland, Sergey Tarasenko & Laura Taylor 
‘Emerging/Developing Country Investment in Antarctica’
Unpublished Essay (University of Canterbury, Gateway Antarctica, 2009)  
4 Ibid  
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Previous Literature  
 
As mentioned earlier, there has been no exploration of the topic done before. 
There are a few works relating to the history of New Zealand’s Antarctic 
politics. A Wise Adventure by Malcolm Templeton5 discussed New Zealand’s 
role in Antarctic politics between 1920 and 1960, but focuses on the 
multilateral cooperation rather that New Zealand’s bilateral links and the 
research ends in 1960.  
 
On the US-New Zealand relationship, Antarctic Partners by Neville Peat6 
gives a history from 1957 to 2007, but is a ‘celebration’ rather than an analysis 
of the relationship and does not provide any insights. Analysis of these 




One explanation for the way that these bilateral relationships have developed 
and have remained separate from New Zealand’s other interests could be that 
the organisational regimes of Antarctic decision making has had an influence. 
 
Graham Allison in his book The Essence of Decision critiqued the traditional 
rational actor model of international relations discourse and presented in turn 
two other models for analysing decision making of states. In his organisational 
politics model, he drew from organisation theory and argued that instead of 
states being one unified body that thought with one mind, states are made up 
of a number of organisations and it is the output of these organisations is the 
foreign policy of states.7
 
                                                 
5 Malcolm Templeton, A Wise Adventure (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000) 
6 Neville Peat, Antarctic Partners (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2007) 
7 Graham T Allison, The Essence of Decision, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971) 67 
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Following Allison’s model, power is fractured.8 One organisation has 
responsibility for one area, for example, diplomacy; another has responsibility 
for a different area, such as logistics. They are permitted to operate in those 
areas, and do not operate in the others.9 From this fractured power structure, 
‘organizational parochialism’ develops – a narrow view of what the 
organisation should concern itself with based on the area it operated, which 
influences how it believes it should operate and solve problems.10
 
Due to this narrow mindset, the behaviour of these organisations follows a set 
of pre-established routines.11 These routines are influenced by the 
organisations goals (chief of which is its survival).12 From these goals, certain 
behaviours result. Most notably, organisations tend to follow standard 
practices and compete for resources with other organisations.13 The results of 
these actions can be moves by organisations that vary from leadership policy 
and clash with the actions of other organisations.14
 
Governmental leaders can influence the organisations, however, it is not 
always so that a leader can have much of an effect on the way the 
organisation conducts itself. If they do not make an effective and concerned 
effort to affect the way the organisation operates, the organisation will operate 
how it always has.15  
 
Adding a further step onto this model, is that one of the organisations that has 
considerable say in New Zealand’s Antarctic policy is the an organisation of 
another state: the National Science Foundation (NSF). The organisational 
forces at work in New Zealand regarding its Antarctic organisations would be 
at work in the US. In fact, Allison’s model was created explaining decision 
making of large US governmental organisational structures. Therefore, it 
                                                 
8 Ibid, 80 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid, 81 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid, 82 
13 Ibid, 93 
14 Ibid, 89 
15 Ibid, 86 
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would be artificial to assume that the NSF part of a homogenous entity known 
as the ‘US government’ after using the assumption that New Zealand’s 
Antarctic policy is made by separate organisations. As such, it is the NSF’s 
actions and not the US government’s policy that this paper will concern itself 
with.  
 
This means the same assumptions that are applied to the DSIR, Antarctica 
New Zealand and Antarctic Policy Division/Unit apply to the NSF. Of particular 
interest is the assumption relating to the lack of control by government 
leaders. While the US policy towards New Zealand during the time this essay 
is concerned with was unfavourable due to New Zealand’s policy on nuclear 
ships, it does not necessarily follow that the NSF’s policy was similarly 
unfavourable towards New Zealand. However, as shall be discussed later, 
there is some evidence that suggests that the NSF may have been punishing 
New Zealand for its controversial stance.  
 
Finally, the model compliments the primary sources. What was available for 
this study were the documents of government organisation – the Antarctic 
Division of the DSIR - which were mostly communications between it and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and it and similar Antarctic institutions.  
 
Allison’s model has been heavily criticised by other scholars of foreign policy. 
One criticism that has particular relevance to the topic discussed in this paper 
is that Allison assumes that the goals of the organisations clash.16 As shall be 
discussed later in this paper, it appears that New Zealand’s Antarctic 
organisations are an example of when organisation’s goals do not clash, for 
the most part.  
 
The model further does not apply brilliantly to the case presented towards it. 
Allison being focused on the Cuban Missile Crisis poses the question of the 
creation of foreign policy as organisations responding to problems. Even the 
act of buying defensive missiles before the crisis is presented as addressing 
                                                 
16 Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H Hammond ‘Rethinking Allison’s Model’ The American 
Political Science Review Vol.86 No.2 pp.301-322 
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the problem of the Cold War.17 Whereas New Zealand’s bilateral is the 
development of opportunities rather than addressing problems. It is not the 
fact the organisations responded badly, or in a manner inconsistent with the 
policy of the leadership, rather that they missed out on an opportunity to 




There are a number of government organisations that have a hand in 
Antarctic diplomacy through state institution to states institution contact. 
Organisations come and go, but there always seems to be one organisation 
that deals with logistics, while another deals with matters of politics, law and 
policy.  
 
Antarctica New Zealand 
 
Established in 1996 by the New Zealand Antarctic Institute Act 1996. One of 
the functions of Antarctica New Zealand is to ‘co-operate with other 
institutions and organisations both within and outside New Zealand having 
objectives similar to those of New Zealand.’18  
 
Located in Christchurch, Antarctica New Zealand is the major player today 
when it comes to logistical relationships. However, in the time frame that has 
been studied in this paper, it was not in existence. Matters of Antarctic 
logistics were covered by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(DSIR). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
The Ministry has had a few different names over the years, but has always 
been the same Wellington based entity throughout the time frame of this 
                                                 
17 Allison, above n.7, 67 
18 Antarctica New Zealand, Statement of Intent 2008-2011 (Antarctica New Zealand, June 
2008) 4 
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study. The division of the Ministry which deals with Antarctic matters is the 
Antarctic Policy Unit, previously known and the Antarctic Policy Division. The 
responsibilities of the Ministry in respect to Antarctica include dealing with the 
Antarctic Treaty System, giving advice to the government and ensuring 
compliance with international agreements that New Zealand is party to 
regarding Antarctica as well as ‘Conducting New Zealand's relations with 
other countries in respect of Antarctica’19
 
The Antarctic Policy Unit is just one section of the Ministry. Other sections 
have their own mandate to deal with other issues, and it could be argued that 
Allison’s model could apply within the Ministry itself. With each division 
concerned with its own mandate, parochialism could develop. This essay is 
concerned not with the other divisions, but with the Antarctic Policy Unit.  
 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) 
 
The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is the organisation 
predating Antarctica New Zealand as the coordinator of New Zealand’s 
Antarctic activities.  
 
The DSIR was an organisation created in 1926 for the purpose of science. It 
ran New Zealand’s Antarctic science programme during the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58,20  with the Antarctic Division (NZAP) 
being set up in 1959 when it became apparent that New Zealand was going to 
maintain its presence in Antarctica.21 DSIR was disestablished in 1992 and 
the Antarctic Division was transferred to the Ministry of External Relations and 
Trade.22
 
                                                 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Antarctica and New Zealand' 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Antarctica/1-New-Zealand-and-
Antarctica/index.php (accessed 19 February 2009) 
20 Ross Galbreath, DSIR: Making Science Work for New Zealand, (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 1998) 247 
21 Ibid, 256 
22 Ibid, 256 
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In the past, the Ministry and DSIR worked together coordinating Antarctic 
cooperative arrangements. However, there is evidence of some competition 
between the two organisations. With talks with Sweden, the Ministry was 
designated the contact point. The Antarctic Division protested this decision, 
stating that all communications would likely be regarding logistics and citing 
that all other agreements over Antarctic cooperation had previously been 
handled by the Division23 and on occasion reminded the Swedish authorities 
that it was DSIR that handled matters of Antarctic policy.24
 
National Science Foundation (NSF) 
 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) was created in 1950 with the mission 
‘To promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, 
prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defence.’25 The office that looks 




The documents available for research went up only to the year 1994. There is 
some information available about the bilateral relationships as they are today, 
from information on various state’s Antarctic programmes and where they are 
operating from, to talking with those involved to observations that can be 
made.26  
 
Being that this paper is an investigation into New Zealand's use of its Antarctic 
advantage to build relationships, the case studies chosen were Sweden and 
France. These two states have cooperation agreements with New Zealand 
that appear to be never used. The initial hypothesis was that these 
                                                 
23 R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey 'Re New Zealand Contact Under the Antarctic 
Cooperation Agreement with Sweden' December 1986 [Date obscured] 
24 J J W Bailey, Letter to Anders Karlqvist, 6 May 1985 
25 National Science Foundation Investing in America’s Future: Strategic Plan 2006-2011 
(Washington: National Science Foundation, September 2006), 4 
26 For example: the author of this paper flew down to Antarctica on a South African owned 
and operated aircraft paid for by the Italian government as it’s contribution to the logistical 
pool.  
 10
GCAS 08/09 Supervised Project  Elizabeth Holland 
agreements were organised symbolic gestures for the purpose of creating 




In the 1980s, there were moves for Sweden to operate its fledgling Antarctic 
programme through Christchurch and have joint Antarctic activities with New 
Zealand. Approaches were first made in 1985, through the Director of DSIR.27 
It appears that negotiations went very far into this becoming a reality. The 
Swedish government was enthusiastic about the opportunity. One message 
read: ‘We are looking very closely at the Ross Sea area at the moment.’28 
Discussions between New Zealand and Sweden resulted in an agreement on 
Antarctic cooperation signed in 1986.29
 
However, the planned cooperation between New Zealand and Sweden never 
eventuated, the reason being the complicated relationship between New 
Zealand and the USA regarding Antarctic logistics. In 1987, it was made clear 
to the New Zealand authorities that the Americans were unwilling to use the 
resources in the logistics pool to provide for third parties who were not willing 
to contribute.  
 
‘Discussions I have had with Anders Karlqurst both in Christchurch and San Diego 
were amicable and positive. The attitude and new politicise of Peter Wilkniss have 
however tempered these discussions to the extent of my not being in a position to 
even suggest let alone commit ourselves to assisting Sweden through our use of any 
U.S. resources. Wilkniss has states quite clearly that he will not provide New Zealand 
with resources for us to assist third parties’30
 
Furthermore, New Zealand began to have its doubts about working with 
Sweden.  
 
                                                 
27 R B Thomson, letter to C Beeby, 21 January 1985 
28 Message reprinted in R B Thomson, Letter to C Keating, 'Antarctica: Sweden/New Zealand' 
19 November 1986. Emphasis as in the original document 
29 New Zealand and Sweden, 3 June 1986, Exchange of Letters constituting and agreement 
concerning Antarctic cooperation  
30 R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey, 2 March 1987 
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‘The difficulties with the Swedes arise from their optimistic expectations of our joint 
relationship and the sensitivity of using United States logistic resources to support 
New Zealand-Swedish activities.’31
 
It appears that the negotiations fell apart.  
 
One question that emerges from the saga of the Swedish cooperation was the 
role the NSF played in preventing the cooperation. The unwillingness of the 
rejection came at a time when the US-New Zealand relationship was 
particularly strained in the wake of the ANZUS row.  
 
Further, the Swedish authorities noticed the way that New Zealand was being 
treated by the NSF, and they worried that it would hinder any plans to operate 
out of Christchurch. In a memorandum dated 13 October 1986, one official 
noted about the Swedes:  
 
‘Their main concern is the attitude of the Americans which Theutenberg described as 
“rude” and “explicitly negative.” He thought this as party to be explained by Peter 
Wilkness’s personality and that national science foundation did not want third parties 
in McMurdo area. But at the end of our meeting he wondered aloud whether 
American attitude was reflection of the ANZUS problem. He implied that he did not 
want too see Swedish plans bogged down in a NZ/USA conflict.’32  
 
It is quite possible that the ANZUS conflict was the reason that the NSF 




The possibility of the French Antarctic programme operating out of 
Christchurch began in 1992. A runway was being constructed at Dumont 
D'Urville station, and with flights being capable of landing, a launching pad 
was needed. Christchurch was in competition with Hobart, which while Hobart 
closer in proximity to the French station, Christchurch’s infrastructure was 
                                                 
31 JJW Bailey, Letter to Colin Keating, 21 October 1986 
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade internal memorandum 13 October 1986 
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superior.33 To assist in cooperation, an agreement was drafted and signed, 
one which purposely reflected the Italian agreement.34  
 
The relationship with France fell through when the runaway was damaged 
and later abandoned by the French programme. Acknowledgement was made 
that the agreement signed between France and New Zealand would be 
science based rather than logistical.35
 
It appears that the initial negotiation began with a representative of the French 
Antarctic programme approaching the head of the New Zealand Antarctic 
programme at the time, regarding the cooperation.36 Again, as with the 
Swedes, it was the other government that took the initiative. In negotiations in 
Paris, the head of the NZAP. requested embassy officials to be present at the 
meeting in France,37 so both organisations were connected with the effort at 
an early state.  
 
In the end, the French agreement amounted to little due to bad fortune and an 




This paper will now briefly discuss New Zealand’s cooperation relationship 
with Chile, Malaysia and South Korea. These three provide interest because a 
slightly different approach has been taken. New Zealand has relationships 
with a number of other states, such a logistical relationship with Italy and 
cooperation agreements with Germany and Switzerland, 38 all worthy of closer 
examination. 
 
                                                 
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade internal memorandum 'NZ/France: Antarctica' 13 
January 1994 
34 Stuart Prior, Letter to Keith Jordan, 14 September 1994 
35 Ibid 
36 D E Geddes, Letter to Christian Dors, 26 August 1992 
37 George Belloew, Facsimile to Stuart Prior, 23 December 1993 
38 Prior, above n.1 
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Chile 
 
New Zealand has a bilateral treaty of Antarctic cooperation with Chile. Chile 
appears to be the one example in which it was proposed that New Zealand 
could benefit in areas such as trade from closer Antarctic cooperation with 
Chile. About the formation of the agreement it was written: ‘Chile is an 
increasingly important trading partner of New Zealand and our relationships 
with it are developing in a number of areas.’39However, it was Chile that 




Currently, New Zealand provides logistical support for Malaysian scientists 
working in the Ross Sea region. This cooperation dates back to 1999.41 When 
the author was at Scott Base in December 2008, Malaysian scientific 
equipment was being stored in the Hillary Field centre, awaiting use. The 
details of the cooperation are unknown, but it does appear that third party 
logistics are talking place now. Further research is require to know the 




Interest in South Korea as an Antarctic logistical partner dates back to 1992.42 
Currently, there are talks of Christchurch being a launching point for South 
Korea’s Antarctic programme, which is timely given that there are moves 
being made towards a free trade agreement with South Korea. In November 
2007 a joint feasibility study was completed43 and submissions are now 
                                                 
39 Stuart Prior, Letter to the Director of the New Zealand Antarctic Programme, 20 August 
1993 
40 Ibid 
41 Brady et al, above n.3 
42 S W Prior, Letter to the Ambassador of the New Zealand Embassy in Seoul, 14 December 
1992 
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open.44 However, these negotiations are not linked.45 There could be benefits 
in linking the talks. For example, the FTA negotiations may be more set in 
stone than the logistical arrangement, and tying the logistical arrangement to 
the FTA could ensure the logistics negotiations do not fall through.  
 
The United States 
 
The United State bilateral relationship provides crucial support for New 
Zealand’s own Antarctic programme. The cooperation began in 1957.  
Logistical cooperation is crucial for New Zealand's Antarctic programme, from 
the provision of flights to the sharing of resources on Ross Island. In 1985, 
when US-New Zealand relationship was at a low point, in a letter from the 
DSIR to the Ministry, it was urged (in capitals and red ink) that New Zealand’s 
Antarctic activity could not continue without the logistical support of the United 
States.46 This gives the NSF an enormous amount of power in the 
relationship.  
 
Due to the timing of the collapse of the Swedish cooperation negotiations, the 
question has to be asked: was the denial of Antarctic logistics to third parties 
New Zealand want to get into cooperation in punishment New Zealand’s 
stance on nuclear powered ships?  
 
The answer to the question is unclear. It is clear that the ANZUS row was on 
the minds of those involved in Antarctica at the time. There was call from 
some official voices in the United States for America to move its logistical 
base to Hobart or the Falkland Islands.47
 
                                                 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 'Call for Submissions on the potential for a New 
Zealand- Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement' January 2009 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships/Call-for-public-
submissions/index.php#trade-relations (Accessed 17 February 2009) 
45 Trevor Hughes, ‘RE: Questions from a GCAS student for a supervised project’ Email, 16 
February 2009  
46 R B Thomson, Letter to Wilson Bailey, 18 March 1985 
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs internal memorandum regarding US Secretary of the Navy's visit, 
5 November 1986 
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However, it appears the director of the NSF at the time did not want to bring 
the ANZUS row into Antarctic cooperation, or at least the director of STAR 
laboratories wrote to the director of DSIR at the time of the appointment.48 Of 
course, it may have been that the Swedish were unwilling to contribute to the 
logistical pool. Information is not available regarding the exact details of the 
negotiations. Further more, while Wilkness, a later director, was described as 
difficult, report were that he was trying to keep ANZUS politics out of Antarctic 
cooperation.49 Given the information, there can be no definitive conclusion 




The questions that arise are: given the potential benefit and the interest that 
has been expressed in the past from some states, why does New Zealand not 
have more Antarctic connections? And why does it not link them more closely 
in with its other goals? The answer to the first question is a matter of 
capability that can be explained by the role of the NSF. The answer to the 
latter a lack of attention that can be explained using the organisational politics 
model.  
 
One of the most interesting points that came out of the research is the fact 
that New Zealand’s ability to build bilateral Antarctic cooperation relationships 
in the past has been dependant on United States cooperation, in particular, 
the NSF. It is unclear whether the Swedish example was an anomaly, but the 
example does illustrate that the logistical arraignment gives the NSF 
considerable power, and may have prevented New Zealand cooperating with 
the Swedish Antarctic Programme.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that New Zealand cannot – or at least could not in the 
mid-1980s – maintain its Antarctic presence without the logistical support of 
the United States has potential legal ramifications regarding its claim to the 
                                                 
48 Antony C Fraser-Smith, Letter to Robert Thomson, 16 December 1985 
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Internal Memorandum from Washington to 
Wellington, 10 July 1986 
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continent. Perfection of the claim requires effective occupation, and it appears 
that without the NSF, New Zealand cannot effectively occupy even Scott 
Base.  
 
Finally, it appears that misfortune also occasionally played a hand, as 
illustrated by the French runway. The lack of the ability to use of Christchurch 
as a base causes New Zealand to lose out on the economic benefits that 
could be had.  
 
The next question that arises is why New Zealand does not use its Antarctic 
ties to strengthen relationships. Why, for example, is New Zealand not 
approaching India with offers of using Christchurch, in a effort to create 
friendly ties in the hope of a creating a free trade agreement? Why are the 
FTA talks with South Korea remaining separate?  
 
It is Allison’s governmental organisations model that can explain the lack of 
attention. The DSIR - and this may extend to Antarctica New Zealand today -  
was not concerned with strengthening New Zealand’s bilateral ties with other 
states in areas such as trade. Its mandate and concern is with New Zealand’s 
Antarctic logistics and science and forays into bilateral politics are to do with 
logistics and science, and little else. Considering a logistical arrangement in 
the wider context of the relationship with that particular state, for example, 
trade, it outside of the scope of its operation. The same goes for the Antarctic 
Policy Unit, which seems to focus on the bilateral relationship in terms of 
Antarctic logistics again, and little else. It appears the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade is suffering a degree of ‘organisational parochialism’ within 
itself.  
 
However, Allison’s model does not match perfectly. The goals of the 
organisations are in conflict, as Allison’s model assumes.50 These 
organisations also are not in competition, as Allison’s model implies. It is that 
                                                 
50 Thomson and Hammond, above n.16, 302 
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it seems organisations are unaware that these bilateral ties could be used to 
improve upon relationships and potential bring benefit to New Zealand.  
 
It seems the earlier parts of the model were more useful than later. 
Organisational parochialism is useful in explaining the blind spot. However, 
the rest of Allison’s model does not assist in the understanding of New 
Zealand’s Antarctic politics at all. The idea of competing organisations does 
not fit, and standards of practice apply only tentatively.  
 
While this essay has focused on the New Zealand institutions in regards to 
the major case studies of Sweden and France with no exploration of the 
institutions that the New Zealand organisations were dealing with. When 
negotiating cooperation agreements, the New Zealand organisations were 
dealing with their logistical counterparts overseas. There may have been no 
opportunity to go further. Allison writes that international counterparts can 
entrench parochialism being that they all have similar mandates and do not 
look beyond them51 and this may be the case in the circumstances. 
 
In the end, the blind spot towards Antarctica caused by the ‘organisational 





There are two reasons why New Zealand does not use its Antarctic bilateral 
connections to improve upon relationships. The first can be explained by the 
model that this paper has worked with: governmental politics. While some of 
the Allison's model is unhelpful, the idea of 'organisational parochialism' is a 
useful tool for understanding the blind spot towards Antarctica.  
 
The second reason emerged on researching the Swedish cooperation 
agreement. The NSF has a huge amount of influence in logistical 
                                                 
51 Allison, above n.7, 81 
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arrangements. New Zealand cannot make promises on Antarctic logistics, 
because at the end of the day, the NSF has a huge amount of power to 
decline should they not wish to provide the logistics.  
 
The area of bilateral cooperation between New Zealand and other states has 
been barely explored. Even the most noticeable relationship with the US has 
generated little research. This paper is just scratching the surface of the 
subject area. Future areas for research include a more detailed exploration of 
New Zealand's Antarctic connection with the NSF and the relationship with 
Italy, a smaller party that operates out of Christchurch.  
 
Finally, the question has to be asked, should New Zealand use its Antarctic 
advantage to improve upon bilateral relationships? Would this politicise the 
Antarctic cooperation to the point where it becomes unmanageable? It may be 
that New Zealand and/or Antarctica benefits more from the status quo.  
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